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Abstract 
We present a simple principal-agent experiment in which the principals are allowed to choose 
between a revenue sharing, a bonus and a trust contract, to offer to an agent. Our findings 
suggest that a large majority of experimental subjects choose the revenue sharing contract. 
This choice not only turns out to be the most efficient but at the same time is fair. Overall, the 
distribution of earnings is only mildly skewed towards the principal. We conclude that under 
revenue sharing contracts concerns for fairness can go in hand with the use of monetary 
incentives. 
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JEL Classification: C91, J41, M52 
2 
 
* We thank Enrique Fatas, David Masclet, Anders Poulsen, Klaus Schmidt, two anonymous reviewers, and 
participants to presentations in Cologne and Norwich for advice. The experimental instructions and other 
appendices are available online. The experiment was programmed using Z-Tree (Fischbacher, 2007) and the 
experimental dataset is available from the first author. 
I. Introduction 
This paper employs an experiment to compare how principals choose among three different 
contract types: revenue sharing contracts, bonus contracts and trust contracts. Contract choice 
is clearly important from the perspective of the efficiency of any transactions that involves 
principals and agents, and yet to our knowledge only a limited number of experimental studies 
directly compare different types of contracts, and none has looked at the combinations of 
contracts we consider. We find revenue sharing contracts a particularly useful contract to 
consider as part of the menu of choices offered to the principal. Revenue sharing contracts are 
used extensively in sharecropping (Allen and Lueck, 1992), the video rental industry (Dana and 
Spier, 2001), gate revenue sharing in sports (Szymanski and Kesenne, 2004), law, accounting 
and architecture firms (Greenwood and Empson, 2003), among other professions. These are 
evidently contracts of potentially general interest. 
In a trust contract, the principal pays a fixed wage to the agent and requests an effort level. As 
the fixed wage is paid before the agent decides on an effort level he has no incentive for exerting 
the requested effort. In the bonus contract, in addition to the fixed wage and requested effort, 
the principal announces a voluntary bonus she is willing to pay if the exerted effort is equal to 
or exceeds the requested effort. As this announcement is not binding, there is still no incentive 
to exert effort. However, Fehr et al. (2007) find that when offered the choice between an 
enforceable monitoring contract and a non-enforceable bonus contract, most principals (roughly 
90%) preferred the bonus contract. Additionally, the effort exerted by the agents and the average 
payoff for both the principals and the agents were higher in bonus contract than in monitoring 
contract settings (Fehr et. al., 2007).  Fehr et al.’s (2007) interpretation of their findings is that 
3 
 
the bonus contract was preferred to the monitoring contract due to fairness concerns.  It is 
possible however that a contract that contained the opportunity of fining could have been 
perceived as a hostile act itself and might send the agent a signal of distrust (see Dickinson and 
Villeval, 2008; Fehr and Rockenbach, 2003; and Frey, 1998).1 This in turn could have increased 
the likelihood to shirk by generating a self-fulfilling prophecy of distrust (see Bacharach et al., 
2007). In contrast, in an experiment employing revenue sharing contracts, where a principal 
defines a fixed wage and additionally offers the agent a share of the total (gross) revenue, 
Anderhub et al. (2002) found that principals “clearly recognize the agency problem and react 
accordingly” (p.24) by developing incentive compatible and profit maximizing contracts; 
however, a significant proportion of the principals also take concerns of fairness into account 
in the sense of providing larger than the predicted shares of the total revenue to the agents. In 
principle, a contract that ex ante reduces the risk for the principal could be quite attractive to a 
risk averse principal, and contracts based on revenue sharing or bonuses would not have the 
negative connotations of distrust of a monitoring contract with fines. 
Our experiment builds on the work of Anderhub et al. (2002) and Fehr et al. (2007) by providing 
principals the option to choose among a revenue sharing contract, a bonus contract or a trust 
contract.2 The trust and bonus contracts we used are similar to those in Fehr et al. (2007). In the 
revenue sharing contract a principal defines a non-negative fixed wage and additionally offers 
the agent a share of the total (gross) revenue. The revenue sharing contract implicitly assumes 
that effort and revenue are observable and verifiable. Although, under such circumstances, it 
would also be possible to write a ‘forcing contract’ which requires agents to exert the efficient 
                                                 
1
 More generally, the contract choice may provide important information to the employee regarding the employer 
(e.g. Falk and Kosfeld, 2006) or even the behavior of other employees (Danilov and Sliwka, 2013), which in turn 
may have either positive or negative effects on the intrinsic motives of agents. Bowles and Polania-Reyes (2012) 
provide a systematic review of what they identify as the four crowding out mechanisms of intrinsic incentives. 
2
 As discussed more below, the trust contract may be seen as a special case of both the bonus and the revenue 
sharing contracts. However, we chose to present it as an explicit option to control for any potential pressure the 
principals may have felt on using all the mechanisms available in each contract (given they have chosen it).  
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effort level and punish them severely if they would deviate, offering such a contract may be 
perceived as a signal of distrust by the agents (irrespective of the preferences of the principal).3 
The revenue sharing contract allows fairness concerns to be expressed by offering a generous 
share of the total revenue to the agent. Hence, a principal can express social preferences in both 
the bonus contract and the revenue sharing contract if he or she chooses to do so.  
Our key finding is that principals tend to choose revenue sharing contracts over alternatives, in 
both one-shot and repeated games, and the revenue sharing contracts that they choose make 
agents on average no worse off in absolute terms than if a different contract had been chosen. 
In relative terms, agents overall received as much as 47% of the earnings. In the repeated games, 
switches from bonus contract or trust contracts to revenue sharing contracts are Pareto superior 
for a majority of both principals and agents. Therefore, efficiency and fairness complement 
each other.4  
Our results are, in spirit, connected to Chan (2006), who presented a trust game experiment 
showing that both efficiency and equity can matter, and to Güth et al. (1993), who devised a 
multi-period ultimatum game where efficiency and fairness can complement each other. 
Undoubtedly there are contexts where the tension rather than complementarity between 
efficiency and fairness is a real one (e.g. Ackert et al., 2007, and Bone et al., 2004). Our claim 
of complementarity is one that applies to a contract design environment where revenue sharing 
is an option. 
The remainder of this article is structured as follows: section 2 presents the theoretical 
predictions, the experimental design and the hypotheses. Section 3 provides the results of the 
experiment. Section 4 offers a discussion of the results and section 5 concludes. Online 
                                                 
3
 See Bowles and Polania-Reyes (2012) for a review of crowding out mechanisms on preferences. 
4
 While following a different approach, there is some parallelism with Murdock (2002), who presents a model 
combining intrinsic incentives and efficiency in contract design. Conversely, Prendergast (2008) suggests selecting 
agents by their preferences. Other researchers have pointed out that monetary incentives might work, but that their 
effectiveness depends on the degree of the agents’ intrinsic motivation (Boly, 2010) or the size of the monetary 
incentives (James, 2005). 
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appendices include more details on experimental parameters and predictions (appendix A), 
experimental instructions (B) as well as more experimental results and further econometric 
analysis (C, D and E). 
II. Experimental Design and Hypotheses 
Experimental Design 
In our experiment a principal, the employer, hires an agent, the employee, to carry out 
production. For every unit of effort  the agent exerts, the principal receives 150 Experimental 
Currency Units (ECU). In other words, the total revenue is given by  = 150 ∗ . The agent 
bears an effort cost of 
 =  +  with  ∈  0,1, … ,19,20. Subjects have a fixed role of 
either principals or agents, and this was common knowledge.  The experiment is divided in 5 
games and has 10 rounds in total. In each round both the principal and the agent receive initial 
endowments of 3000 ECU. The purpose of the endowments was to ensure that neither the agent 
nor the principal could make any losses. The differences across games are in the type of 
employment contract the principal can offer to the agent, i.e. a trust contract, a bonus contract, 
a revenue sharing contract or a choice among the three, and whether the game is repeated 
(which allows for reputation building) or one-shot. In each game principals are matched with a 
different agent, and this is also common knowledge. Games are in one of two possible orders, 
described in Figure 1, and are explained below. 
[Insert Figure 1 about here] 
In an exogenous trust contract setting (TC-ex) the principal chooses the size of a fixed wage ,  
where  ∈  0,1, … ,2999,3000, and suggests an effort level to the agent which is not binding. 
Then the agent is informed about the offered contract and decides to accept or reject the 
contract. If the contract is rejected then both receive only their initial endowments of 3000 ECU. 
If the agent accepts the contract he receives the fixed wage and decides on an effort level. 
Afterwards, both the agent and the principal get informed about their earnings. 
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In an exogenous bonus contract setting (BC-ex) the principal in addition to the fixed wage and 
suggested effort he or she announces the size of a non-binding bonus,  where  ∈
 0,1, … ,2999,3000,  he or she may pay to the agent if satisfied by his or her effort level. 
Afterwards, the agent is informed about the offered contract and if the contract is accepted 
decides on an effort level. After being informed about the agent’s effort level, the principal 
decides the bonus he or she wants to give to the agent, if any. Finally, both the agent and the 
principal get informed about their earnings. 
In an exogenous revenue sharing contract setting (RSC-ex) the principal chooses the fixed 
wage, suggests an effort level and offers a share  where  ∈  0.00, 0.01, … ,0.99,1.00 of the 
total (gross) revenue that will be given to the agent. Afterwards, the agent is informed about the 
offered contract and if he or she accepts the offered contract decides on an effort level. Finally, 
both the agent and the principal get informed about their earnings.
 
In a one-shot Trust-Bonus-Revenue sharing game (TBR) there is an additional first step in 
which the principal can choose which of the 3 possible contracts to offer; the trust, the bonus 
or the revenue sharing contract. After the principal has chosen contract type he proceeds with 
selecting the parameters of the relevant contract and offers it to the agent as in the previous 
games. 
The repeated Trust-Bonus-Revenue sharing game (TBR-r) is identical to the TBR but is 
repeated for 6 rounds with the same co-player. 
Theoretical Predictions 
In the following, we derive hypotheses under two scenarios: (i) when the agent is self-interested 
and (ii) when the agent is inequality averse. Since the principal has a first-mover advantage, 
whether she is inequality averse or self-interested does not alter the theoretical predictions. 
Hence, in the following we assume that the principal is narrowly self-interested.   
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The principal chooses between the three contracts, explained below, and makes an offer to the 
agent. If the agent accepts the contract he could then choose his desired effort level. Three 
different contract types are available to the principals: the trust contract (TC), the bonus contract 
(BC) and the revenue sharing contract (RSC).  The agent’s gross profit in the case of a TC, BC 
and RSC are respectively defined as: π = F , π = F + B and π!" = F + S ∗ Re.  
For all three contract types, a narrowly self-interested agent will only accept a contract if he is 
at least not worse off by accepting it. Hence, the agent’s participation constraint can be written 
as & − 
 ≥ 0, where & is the transfer the principal needs to provide to the agent as 
compensation for exerting effort at a cost 
. As the principal wishes to minimize the transfer 
to induce participation, she will set it just large enough to make the agent participate to the 
contract, i.e. at the point where & = 
. The principal’s profit is defined as )* =  −
&, where  is the total revenue generated and & the transfer to the agent. Given the 
revenue and cost functions introduced above, maximizing the principal’s profit with respect to 
 results in  = 74.5. The experimental parameters only allow  ∈  0,1, … ,19,20, and so this 
maximization problem has a corner solution of ∗ = 20.5 
Having identified the participation constraint and the profit maximizing effort level, the 
following step is to show why, given the assumption that both the principal and the agent are 
rational and narrowly self-interested, the only contract that can satisfy the incentive 
compatibility constraint is the RSC.6  
Replacing & with the revenue sharing contract’s specific transfer of &-./ =  +  ∗ 150 
results in the incentive compatibility constraint: ∀e: F + S ∗ 150e∗ − e∗ − e∗ ≥ F + S ∗
150e − e − e. Given that the agent would exert an effort greater than zero if )2∗ ≥ )2 
                                                 
5
 The decision to have a corner solution has been made deliberately expecting that it will be easier for subjects in 
the role of principals to identify e* if that is a corner than an interior point. In other words, the choice for a corner 
solution was made to reduce complexity. 
6
 This assumes that both principals and agents are payoff maximizers.  
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is satisfied, the agent would, as a worst case accept, )2∗ = )2. Maximizing the agent’s 
profit )-./2 =  +  ∗ 150∗ − ∗ − ∗ with respect to  ∗, inserting the optimal effort level 
∗ = 20 and solving for , results in S = 0.2733 , i.e. narrowly self-interested agents would react 
with ∗ = 20 to any share S ≥ 0.27. Hence, the principal will set S=0.27 and F=0. 
In a trust contract the principal offers the agent an unconditional fixed wage  and suggests the 
agent to provide an effort level  4. However, if the agent accepts this offer, the suggested effort 
level 4 cannot be enforced by the principal. Consequently, the principal’s monetary payoff 
resulting from a trust contract &
, 4 is defined as Re − F, whereas the agent earns F −
Ce. Under the assumption of self-interest, the principal will never offer a positive fixed wage 
and the agent will never exert any effort. 
In a bonus contract, the principal offers a fixed wage  and suggests an effort level 4. 
However, differently from the TC, the principal also announces to pay a bonus  ∈
 0,1, … ,2999,3000 if the agent delivers the suggested effort level. After the agent’s effort 
choice, the principal has the opportunity to pay the agent a voluntary bonus in addition to the 
fixed wage . Neither the agent’s effort level  nor the principal’s bonus payment  are 
enforceable. In addition, the principal is not restricted by the initially announced bonus, i.e. she 
can pay a bonus smaller equal or larger to the one initially announced. Similar to above, if both 
principal and agent are self-interested the principal will never pay a fixed wage or bonus, and 
the agent will always choose an effort level of zero. 
Now we discuss inequity averse agents. In this paper we understand inequity averse agents to 
have a utility function as defined in Fehr and Schmidt (1999). Note that this utility function 
defines an agent’s utility: 
62 = )2 − 7 ∙ max)* − )2, 0 − < ∙ max )2 − )* , 0   (1) 
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where )2 and )* denote the monetary payoffs for agents and principals, respectively. The 
parameters 7 and < describe the degree to which the agent dislikes being worse off and better 
off than the principal, respectively. 
For revenue sharing contracts, if the agent does not only care about his own but also about the 
principal’s income, the participation threshold for the share of 0.27 shifts upwards. Considering 
that both principals and agents would receive their endowments of 3000 ECU if no contract 
was formed, an agent would accept a contract and exert an effort greater than zero only if 
62)2 = 1, )* = 1 > 62)2 = 3000, )* = 3000. Since )-./2 =  +  ∙ 150 −
 −  and )-./* = 150 −  −  ∙ 150 we can re-write the agent’s utility as 6-./2 =  +  ∙
150 −  −  − 7150 −  −  ∙ 150 −  +  ∙ 150 −  − , with  
FOC:  = >??@ABC?.DBDBCB@
@A
, and SOC: −27 − 2 < 0∀7 > −1.   (2) 
Substituting the envy parameter 7 = 1 we get the simpler FOC  = FC?.DBC
F
.
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participation constraint is satisfied if  ≥ 1 which is the case for all shares  ≥ 0.343. Thus, if 
principals make offers to inequity averse agents, the minimum offered shared they can expect 
to be accepted and that consequently results in  > 0 is 0.343.8 By calculating  for  = 20 in 
the FOC above we find that a principal, in order to ensure that the agent exerts an effort of  =
20, should set the offered share to  ≥ 0.52. Since the principal’s payoff linearly increases in 
 ∀ < 1, the principal’s payoff is also maximized by  = 20, even if the agent is inequality 
averse.9  
                                                 
7
 For example Blanco et al. (2011) estimate the parameter to be 7 = 0.93, < = 0.38 which is very close to Fehr 
and Schmidt (1999) whose parameter distributions used means of 7 = 0.85, < = 0.32. 
8
 Note that a Fehr-Schmidt utility function is non-differentiable at )* = )2. For finding the participation constraint 
we only consider the case of )* > )2 as the payoff maximizing principal will always earn more than the inequity 
averse agent by choosing the contract parameters accordingly. 
9
 The online appendix A also discusses predictions under the assumption of inequity averse agents using a utility 
function as proposed by Charness and Rabin (2002). The resulting predictions are qualitatively similar to the ones 
under a Fehr and Schmidt (1999) utility function and are robust against a generous variation of the parameters 
reported in Charness and Rabin (2002).  
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For trust contracts, it is obvious that a payoff maximizing agent should respond with  = 0 to 
the fixed wage . However, if the agent is inequality averse this behavior of complete agent 
inactivity is no longer optimal; neither for the principal nor for the agent and there is scope for 
Pareto improvement. Since the agent is inequality averse (and thus dislikes earning less, and - 
to a lesser extent - also dislikes earning more than the principal), the agent will not free-ride on 
any positive fixed wage, but will choose his effort level according to any positive . The 
principal anticipates this behavior by choosing  such that the agent’s effort choice maximizes 
the principal’s payoff and thus 
  =
BFHIABCB@AJDBC?IA@AIJK
@AI
.
10
      (3) 
Substituting 7 = 1, < = 0.35 and (since it makes the payoff maximizing principal always best 
off)  = 20 results in the optimal offer:  = 1701. 
For bonus contracts, similarly to trust contracts, if the agent is inequity averse, a self-interested 
principal would pay a fixed wage of 1701 ECU and the agent will best respond with an effort 
of 20. Furthermore, the principal will not pay a bonus, i.e.  = 0. 
Regarding the choice between trust contract and bonus contract, using a bonus contract allows 
the principal to reduce the risk she faces from a shirking agent (Fehr et al., 2007), for instance 
by paying half now and half after effort is observed. Consequently, principals may prefer bonus 
contracts to trust contracts. A complementary intuition stems from the fact that the TC is a 
subset of the BC; that is, a principal could always choose the BC and pay solely a fixed wage. 
Therefore, choosing the BC provides greater flexibility to the principal. 
                                                 
10
 This value of  indicates the threshold that makes agents indifferent between exerting  or  − 1∀ ≥ 1. It 
takes into account that agents dislike being worse off, but also being better off than principals. It also follows that 
inequity averse agents will accept any trust contract and produce  > 0 for all  ≥ 58. Thus, in contrast to pure 
payoff maximizing agents where trust and bonus contracts can never satisfy the participation constraint, both 
contracts can satisfied it for inequity averse agents. 
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Hypotheses 
Table 1 below provides a summary of the theoretical predictions for each of the three contracts, 
under the assumptions of: a) both principal and agent are self-interested, and b) the principal is 
self-interested but the agent inequity averse. Under the assumption of self-interest, the revenue 
sharing contract is the only contract that can be devised in an incentive compatible manner. In 
the one-shot bonus or trust contracts there is a zero fixed wage, zero effort and (in the case of 
the bonus contract) a zero bonus. Conversely, by choosing a suitable revenue share for the 
agent, the agent puts in more effort and both principal and agent earn higher profits. In addition, 
even if the agent is inequity averse, the revenue sharing contract remains the most suitable 
choice for the principal. Consequently, we expect that: 
Hypothesis 1: Principals prefer the revenue sharing contract over the bonus or trust contracts. 
Hypothesis 2: Agents provide more effort, and therefore the revenue will be higher, in revenue 
sharing contracts than in bonus or trust contracts. 
Hypothesis 3: In bonus contracts, principals will not meet their announced bonus payments (if 
any). 
Hypothesis 4: In revenue sharing contracts, principals offer incentive compatible contracts, 
and specifically the lowest feasible incentive compatible share of 0.27. 
[Insert Table 1 about here] 
Under rational self-interest we should observe a 60:40 split of the profits in favor of the 
principal. However, it is possible that distributional fairness may come into play and if so we 
might find a more equal distribution than the profit maximizing prediction. 
Hypothesis 5: In revenue sharing contracts, under the assumption of rational self-interested 
agents, the overall profits are distributed in a ratio of 60:40 between principals and agents to 
the disadvantage of the latter. 
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Experimental Sequence  
Subjects read the instructions and filled a short questionnaire for the purpose of checking their 
understanding; explanations of any incorrect answer were provided by the software. Then three 
practice games, identical to the TC-ex, BC-ex, and RSC-ex games, were played to help the 
subjects familiarize with the experiment. The participants could ask questions at the end of each 
practice round. 
The ten payoff-relevant rounds were then played, consisting of one round of TC-ex, BC-ex, 
RSC-ex, and TBR each, plus a TBR-r game of six rounds. The order of games was 
counterbalanced as indicated in Figure 1. At the end of the experiment each participant was 
paid anonymously. All participants were informed at the start of the experiment that a random 
lottery payment mechanism would be used to determine payments, i.e. one of the ten payoff-
relevant rounds was randomly chosen and the participants were paid according to their 
performance in the randomly selected round.11 The Experimental Currency Units (ECUs) 
earned in the randomly selected round were converted into pounds at the rate of £0.004 per 
ECU. 144 students from the University of East Anglia were recruited for the experiment via 
ORSEE (Greiner, 2004). The experiment lasted approximately 1 hour and 30 minutes and 
participants earned on average £15.46.  
III. Results 
A total of 144 subjects participated in the experiment which was conducted at the CBESS 
laboratory at the University of East Anglia. In what follows we consider the contract choice by 
the principal (sub-section 0), the corresponding effort by the agents (sub-section 0), whether 
                                                 
11
 The random lottery system is a standard mechanism employed in the experimental methodology to control for 
wealth effects while not distorting the marginal incentives in each task; for a methodological discussion see Cubitt 
et al. (1998).  
13 
 
the principals honored their bonus promises when a bonus contract was selected (sub-section 
0), and what the data tell us about efficiency and fairness (sub-section 0).12  
Contract choice 
This sub-section considers the choice of contract by the principals. 
Result 1: When given the option to choose between the three contracts, both in the one-shot 
(TBR) and the repeated games (TBR-r) three choices out of four were in favour of the revenue 
sharing contract RSC. The bonus contract (BC) was preferred to the trust contract (TC). 
[Insert Table 2 and Figure 2 about here] 
Table 2 presents the percentage of chosen contracts in the TBR and TBR-r treatments, and 
Figure 2 shows how the proportions evolve over time in the TBR-r. More generally, in line with 
hypothesis 1, the revenue sharing contract was the most preferred contract by principals being 
selected 75% of the times, against 21% and 4% of choices for the bonus contract and the trust 
contract, respectively. These differences are all significant in Wilcoxon tests.13 Table 2 also 
shows that the distribution of choices is virtually indistinguishable between TBR and TBR-r. 
As participants in the TBR-r games repeatedly made choices about contracts and contract 
parameters (principals), accepting or rejecting contracts and setting effort levels (agents), we 
also analyzed behavioral changes over time. As shown in Figure 2, there is an upward trend in 
choice of the RSC in the TBR-r, from in aggregate 71% in the first round to 86% in the last 
one. A multilevel Probit regression with subjects nested in sessions on the likelihood of 
choosing the RSC confirms the statistically significant positive time trend (p<0.001). 
Furthermore, if participants were exposed to the exogenous contract settings before making 
decisions in TBR and TBR-r games (in session 1-6), they were significantly more likely to 
                                                 
12
 For a fine-grained summary of descriptive statistics, see Table C1 in the online appendix. 
13
 In this paper, all non-parametric test statistics were calculated on session level means per game (TC-ex, BC-ex, 
RSC-ex, TBR, or TBR-r), unless stated otherwise. All p-values in the paper are two-tailed unless otherwise 
specified. 
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choose RSC and less likely to choose the BC once they were offered the choice to do so. It 
seems that principals learned about the advantages of the RSC in the exogenous contract 
settings and were happy to choose it on average over 81% of the time as opposed to 66% of the 
time when they were not forced to use all contracts once before selecting their contract of choice 
(see Figure 2). However, in terms of revealed effort levels, we find no significant evidence for 
an order effect for all three contract types. This is confirmed by regression analysis (see Table 
4). Figure 3 indicates which contract parameters principals chose for each of the available 
contracts. In contracts with more than one parameter (i.e. BC, RSC), the contract parameters 
were negatively correlated which suggests that they were used as complements, i.e. principals 
traded-off the offered fixed wage against the announced bonus and the revenue share in BC and 
RSC, respectively. 
[Insert Figure 3 and Table 3 about here] 
Table 3 shows that a large majority of the principals earned less by switching from the RSC to 
either TC or BC, and while half of the agents earned more from the principal switch from RSC 
to BC, none did so from the switch to RSC to TC. Online appendix D provides details on the 
contract parameters chosen by principals (separated by game), and online appendix E on the 
evolution of contract choices over time. 
Effort levels 
This sub-section considers the choice of effort by agents.  
Result 2: Effort levels were on average 60% higher in revenue sharing contracts relative to 
bonus contracts. Effort levels were 50% higher when a bonus contract was used than a trust 
contract. 
[Insert Figure 4 and Table 4 about here.] 
The average effort level across all games under revenue sharing, bonus and trust contracts are 
16.18, 10.06 and 4.9 respectively. Figure 4 illustrates the average effort over time and Table 4 
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presents regressions with agents’ effort as the dependent variable. In line with hypothesis 2, the 
effort levels chosen by the agents in revenue sharing contracts were significantly higher than in 
bonus or trust contracts. This is true for the overall sample and for each of the games separately 
(Wilcoxon p<0.05). The regression coefficient on the RSC dummy is significant, implying, 
other things being equal, an increase in effort in revenue sharing contracts by at least around 9 
points relative to the trust contract. The coefficient of the RSC dummy is also statistically 
significantly higher than the coefficient of the BC dummy, i.e. the regression analysis confirms 
that the RSC results in more effort than the BC (F-test, p<0.001) which itself results in more 
effort than TC. Effort levels were significantly higher with bonus contracts than with trust 
contracts. This is true for the overall sample, for the exogenously set games and for TBR-r 
(p<0.05 for each of the tests). In TBR the difference between bonus and trust contracts was not 
statistically significant due to the very small number of observations14 of TC (p=0.26). The 
results in Table 4 imply that suggested effort positively affected actual effort.15 Other contract 
details mattered as well: in the BC, effort increased in the size of the announced bonus and, in 
the RSC, it increased with the revenue share offered to the agent, particularly if incentive 
compatible, i.e. the offered share was greater than or equal to 0.27. Overall, increasing the fixed 
wage significantly increased effort. However, this result is driven by trust and bonus contracts. 
Analyzing revenue sharing and bonus contracts separately (see column 3 and 4 in Table 4) 
indicates that a higher fixed wage only slightly increased effort in BC whereas it did not have 
any effect on effort under revenue sharing contracts. 
[Insert Figure 5 about here.] 
                                                 
14
 The number of times a TC, a BC or an RSC was selected in the TBR were 3, 15 and 54 respectively.   
15
 Unlike actual effort, suggested effort did not change across treatments, and tended to be close to the maximum 
of 20 (see Table C1 in the online appendix). 
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Honoring bonus payments 
Result 3: In the bonus contract, the majority of principals pay bonuses, but less than they 
announced to pay. 
In line with hypothesis 3, over 81% of all bonus contracts, principals did not honor their initial 
bonus announcements.16 Figure 5 shows how the actual bonus payments were conditioned on 
revealed effort; while there was always a gap between actual and announced bonus payments, 
mean actual bonus payments were lowest when agents produced less than the suggested effort. 
In a further regression analysis (in the online appendix), we show that, in line with previous 
literature (e.g. Fehr and Schmidt, 2000; Fehr and Schmidt 2004; Fehr et. al. 2007), in the bonus 
contract, the actually paid bonus was a positive function of revealed effort. Specifically, we 
find that each extra unit of effort led to around 34 ECU in extra bonus.17  
Efficiency and fairness in revenue sharing contracts 
This sub-section considers the extent to which revenue sharing contracts met considerations of 
efficiency and fairness. 
In line with hypothesis 2, the revenue sharing contract was the most efficient contract. Average 
total revenue was 2238 ECU in RSC-ex versus 1302 ECU in BC-ex and 738 ECU in TC-ex 
(Wilcoxon tests, p<0.01 in all cases). In the TBR, mean total revenue was 2389, 1420 and 200 
ECU when the revenue sharing contract, the bonus contract and trust contract, were chosen 
respectively. In the TBR-r, the corresponding numbers are 2476, 1690 and 200 ECU for the 
revenue sharing contract, the bonus contract and trust contract respectively. Both in TBR as 
well as in TBR-r the average total revenue is highest for revenue sharing contracts (one-sided 
Wilcoxon tests; TBR: RSC vs BC: p=0.025, RSC vs TC: p=0.006; TBR-r: RSC vs BC: p<0.001, 
RSC vs TC: p<0.001). The average total revenue was not significantly different between TBR 
                                                 
16
 They matched it only around 16% of the cases, and provided a higher bonus in less than 3% of the cases. 
17
 The online appendix (Table C3) includes a linear regression (multilevel, mixed effects) model, estimated with 
random intercepts on subjects nested in sessions, in which no other variable is statistically significant.  
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and TBR-r rounds (for all contract types, p>0.4).18 As shown by Table 3, in a majority of cases, 
ranging from 64% to 89% depending on the combination, the total revenue of principal-agent 
pairs went up if the principal switched from BC or TC to RSC, and went down in the opposite 
case.   
Result 4: Over 70% of offered revenue sharing contracts were incentive compatible. However, 
offers tend to be higher than the lowest incentive compatible share of 0.27. 
[Insert Figure 6 about here] 
Figure 6 shows the distribution of revenue shares offered and whether they were accepted or 
rejected by the agents. In line with hypothesis 4, the majority of offered revenue sharing 
contracts (70%) were incentive compatible.19 Not a single principal chose a revenue share of 
exactly 0.27, the share predicted as the profit maximizing one under narrow self-interest.20 The 
mean offered share was 0.382 (median: 0.4), and was not significantly different across RSC-
ex, TBR, and TBR-r games (all Wilcoxon tests between games reveal p>0.4). The actually 
offered shares were significantly higher than the lowest incentive compatible share of 0.27 both 
for the full sample and for each game separately (sign tests, all p<0.05).  However, the offered 
shares were significantly lower than the inequity averse prediction of a 0.52, if 100% of agents 
are assumed inequity averse (sign tests, all p<0.001.). 
Overall, about 7% of the revenue sharing contracts were rejected. When the offered share was 
greater than or equal to 0.27 only 6% of the contracts were rejected whereas 11% of offers with 
shares of less than 0.27 were rejected. With a fixed wage of 0, a share of 0.57 would result in 
an exact 50:50 split between principal and agent.  For this reason we divided the offered shares 
in three categories: the incentive incompatible offers with S < 0.27; the offers which would lead 
                                                 
18
 For descriptive statistics on revenues including standard errors, please see Table C4 in the online appendix. 
19
 Specifically, 74%, 83% and 78% of contracts offered were above 0.27 in RSC-ex, TBR and TBR-r respectively. 
20
 This is true for all RSC occurrences irrespective the game type (RSC-ex, TBR, and TBR-r). However, over 60% 
of the revenue sharing contracts offered “round shares”, i.e. shares that had either 0 or 5 at the second decimal 
place.  
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to the agent earning more than an equal split S > 0.57; and the offers which lied in between 0.27 
≤ S < 0.57. Comparing the three areas of offered shares, i.e. S < 0.27, 0.27 ≤ S < 0.57, and S ≥ 
0.57, we found no statistical difference regarding the rate of rejections between the contract 
offers with S < 0.27 and 0.27 ≤ S < 0.57 (Wilcoxon, p=1). However, the rejection rates of 
contracts that offered S ≥ 0.57 were significantly lower than for offers either of S < 0.27 or of 
0.27 ≤ S < 0.57 (Wilcoxon, p=0.025 and p<0.001, respectively). The average rejection rates 
were 6% and 0% for 0.27 ≤ S < 0.57 and S ≥ 0.57, respectively. In fact, the rejection rate for S 
≥ 0.52, i.e. the predicted share for a population of 100% Fehr and Schmidt (1999) inequity 
averse agents, was 0% as well. The difference between rejection rates below and above 0.52 is 
significant (Wilcoxon: p=0.002).  
The observed mean of offered shares of 0.382 could be explained by a number of factors. First, 
there is no large increase in rejection rate for offers above 0.27 and up to 0.52, and so there is 
reason to believe that principals may be offering a little over 0.27 not to reduce the likelihood 
of being rejected but rather out of fairness. This conjecture is consistent with the findings of 
Anderhub et al. (2002), which suggest concerns for fairness to be the influential factor behind 
offers higher than the incentive compatibility constraint. Second, the observed mean of 0.382 
could be explained by the principals assuming that there is a distribution of the inequity averse 
parameter in the population of agents who differ in the extent to which they are inequity 
averse.21 Third, it is possible that offering larger shares increases the salience of the opportunity 
to benefit from contributing high effort levels.  
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 The goodness of fit of Charness and Rabin’s (2002) model is considered in the online appendix, and is inferior 
to Fehr and Schmidt’s (1999) for the specific setup of this paper. It is less likely that the principals assumed a 
certain share of agents to be perfectly self-interested and the rest of agents to be totally inequity averse as this 
would have resulted in a binomial distribution of offered shares around 0.27 and 0.53 (depending on whether a 
principal believed that she was making an offer to a perfectly self-interested or entirely inequity averse agent). 
However, our data does not support this interpretation (see Figure 6). 
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Result 5: Revenue sharing contracts resulted in a fairer distribution of profits than the profit 
maximizing prediction and this distribution is close to the prediction for inequity averse agents. 
Nevertheless, welfare gains were mostly absorbed by the principals. 
[Insert Table 5 about here] 
Because of most revenue sharing contracts having a revenue share for the agent of more than 
0.27, as shown in Result 4, we would expect to observe a split that is more equal than 60-40% 
for the principal. Table 5 shows that this is indeed the case, with 53% going to the principal in 
the exogenous revenue sharing contract (RSC-ex), 53% in the one-shot game selected revenue 
sharing contracts (TBR) and 54% in the repeated game selected revenue sharing contracts 
(TBR-r), percentages all significantly lower than 60% (Wilcoxon p<0.001). We find no 
significant difference between RSC-ex, TBR, and TBR-r rounds (Wilcoxon, p>0.2). Comparing 
our profit distribution to our theoretical predictions for inequity averse agents or with empirical 
findings from other games suggests that a 53:47 or 54:46 split is quite close to the inequity 
averse prediction of 52:48 (Fehr and Schmidt 1999; Güth et al. 1982). 
[Insert Table 6 about here] 
Table 6 shows that the overall profits were higher in revenue sharing contracts than in trust 
contracts and bonus contracts. It also shows that the principals largely absorbed the surplus, 
earning 18% and 44% more in revenue sharing contracts than in bonus and trust contracts, 
respectively. This higher efficiency applies across all games, and therefore explains why, when 
a choice was given, principals tended to choose revenue sharing contracts.  
The agent’s average profit was larger when a RSC was implemented when compared to a BC 
(Wilcoxon, p=0.039) and at least the same under TC (Wilcoxon, p=0.089). These differences 
are maintained under the exogenous contracts, but the results are not significant for TBR and 
TBR-r. In any case, these results suggest that the agents were at least not worse off in terms of 
earnings when an RSC was implemented. The share of the surpluses between principals and 
agents was almost the same under all three contract types, being very close to the inequity 
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averse prediction. In relative terms agents were almost no worse off in revenue sharing contracts 
than they were in the other contracts (3% relative to trust contracts and 4% relative to bonus 
contracts). In the TBR-r, switches from BC to RSC and from TC to RSC both resulted in higher 
profits for agents (in 56% and 70% of the cases, respectively: see Table 3). 
IV. Discussion  
This paper explored how monetary incentives and intrinsic motivation can complement each 
other in principal-agent settings. We asked principals to choose between using a bonus contract 
as in Fehr et al. (2007), a revenue sharing contract as in Anderhub et al. (2002) and a trust 
contract as a third option. In contrast to Fehr et al. (2007), who found that only 10% of the 
principals chose the enforceable monetarily incentivized contract, in our experiment on average 
over 75% of the principals chose such an option. Moreover, we find that revenue sharing was 
also more efficient than the bonus and trust contracts by leading the agents to exert 60% more 
effort in the RSC as in the BC. Consequently more revenue was generated and on average both 
principals and agents earned more when a revenue sharing contract was used. However, the 
majority of the additional output was absorbed by the principal. That being said, the 
distributions of profits were fairer than the theoretical predictions under self-interest and close 
to the inequity averse prediction. Lastly, in line with Fehr et al. (2007), though on average 
principals reciprocated to positive effort levels with positive bonuses, some principals did not 
pay a bonus at all and the majority of principals (81%) paid a bonus smaller than what they 
initially announced. 
It is not surprising that principals tend to prefer the bonus contracts over the trust contracts. 
Bonus contracts reduce the relative risks for the principal compared to the trust contract by 
allowing to pay a portion of the wage upfront and a portion after effort has been observed. 
Where the trust contract only requires a trusting principal, the bonus contract requires both 
players to show trust to each other. The revenue sharing contract eliminates all risks of free 
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riding for both principal and agent and this is achieved without providing negative connotations 
of distrust, as with a monitoring contract. We believe that these two motives may to a great 
extend explain the differences we observe between our study and that of Fehr et al. (2007), in 
which the bonus contract was the most preferred option. That said, we note that the revenue 
sharing contract differs from the bonus contract both in terms of the shape of the incentive 
mechanism and in terms of risk reduction, and so more research is clearly needed to separate 
out these alternative driving forces.  
Our results are in line with the findings of Fehr et al. (2008) on the optimal allocation of property 
rights. In their study, two parties negotiate over the allocation of ownership rights before 
investing in a project. In one treatment the two parties start with joint ownership and one of the 
two players (the principal) can decide to either sell her share or retain it. In another treatment, 
the principal is the sole owner and can either sell 50% of the firm (i.e. offer joint ownership) or 
offer a fixed wage to the second party. The majority of the principals (approximately 64%) 
preferred joint ownership and similarly the agents responded with high investment levels. Our 
experiment has a different design since it provides a straight choice among a revenue sharing 
contract, a fixed wage contract as well as a bonus contract. There is also no restriction on the 
revenue share that can be offered, making offer shares less attractive to inequity averse agents 
possible. By providing a wider choice set and allowing revenue sharing contracts that could be 
less attractive to inequity averse agents, our experiment therefore provides a more general test 
of the success of revenue sharing than those provided by Fehr et al.’s (2008) settings. An 
additional element of generality was that we tested, and found our results robust to, having a 
one shot relative to a repeated game setup. 
It is a feature of having equal initial endowments that the difference between the payoff 
outcomes under equality and that under 100% self-interested agents is one between a 50:50 and 
60:40 ratio in the revenue sharing contract, even though the underlying behavior is one where 
the revenue share chosen by the principal ranges from 0.27 to 0.57. In future research, one could 
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increase the gap between self-interested and inequity averse predictions by suitable endowment 
changes as a robustness test of our results. 
V. Conclusions 
We have presented a simple principal-agent experiment in which the principals are allowed to 
choose between a revenue sharing, a bonus and a trust contract, to offer to an agent. Revenue 
sharing contracts emerge as the preferred contract by a large number of principals when they 
are given this choice. They provide a ‘carrot’ to agents by encouraging them to work more by 
getting a share of the profits, and this works in a way that the monitoring contract used by Fehr 
et al. (2007) does not when offered as an alternative to bonus contracts. In other words, in 
incentive-compatible type of contracts, carrots appear to work better than sticks. 
A key finding of our experiment is that revenue sharing contracts have the advantage of being 
the most efficient form of contracts while at the same time being fair. The distribution of 
earnings is only mildly skewed towards the principal. Indeed, in the repeated games, switches 
to revenue sharing contracts led to Pareto improvements for a majority of both principals and 
agents. We conclude that under revenue sharing contracts concerns for fairness can go in hand 
with efficiency and the use of monetary incentives. 
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Figure 1: Sequential Structure of the Experiment 
Sessions 1-6 
Round 1 Round 2-7 Round 8 Round 9 Round 10 
TBR TBR-r TC-ex BC-ex RSC-ex 
 
Sessions 7-12 
Round 1 Round 2 Round 3 Round 4 Round 5-10 
TC-ex BC-ex RSC-ex TBR TBR-r 
 
Notes: In the games TC-ex, BC-ex, and RSC-ex the contracts could not be chosen but were set exogenously to be 
a Trust, Bonus, and Revenue Sharing Contract, respectively. TBR and TBR-r represent a one-shot and repeated 
contract choice settings, respectively. 
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Figure 2: Percentage of chosen contracts over time in repeated contract choice settings 
(TBR-r) 
 
Notes: TC, BC and RSC indicate the trust, the bonus and the revenue sharing contract, respectively. The lines 
labelled TBR first only contain observations from subjects that first were confronted with the games TBR and TBR-
r before playing games with exogenously imposed contracts (TC-ex, BC-ex and RSC-ex). Conversely, exogenous 
first indicates that subjects first faced exogenously imposed contracts before giving the principals the choice over 
contract types (see Figure 1 for a description of both orders). If participants were exposed to the exogenous contract 
settings before making decisions in TBR and TBR-r games they were significantly more likely to choose RSC and 
less likely to choose the BC once they were offered the choice to do so (Wilcoxon tests: p=0.020, p=0.001 and 
p<0.001 for TC, BC and RSC, respectively). ). However, in terms of revealed effort levels, we find no order effect 
for all three contract types (Wilcoxon tests: p=0.069, p=0.763 and p=0.362 for TC, BC and RSC choices in all 
TBR-r rounds, respectively). 
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Figure 3: Visualization of contract parameters chosen by the principal 
 
 
 
Notes: The top panel presents a histogram of fixed wage offers for all TCs. The middle panel depicts a scatterplot 
of the announced bonuses (circles) and actual bonuses (triangles) against the corresponding fixed wages for all 
BCs. The announced bonuses are strongly negatively correlated with the fixed wage offers (Spearman: ρ=-0.393, 
p<0.001). However, there is a much weaker and even positive correlation between the actually paid bonuses and 
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the offered fixed wages (Spearman: ρ=0.105, p=0.049). The bottom panel shows a scatterplot of the offered shares 
against the fixed wage in all RSCs. The negative correlation between share and fixed wage (Spearman: ρ=-0.431) 
is highly significant (p<0.001). The grey areas in the middle and the bottom panel represent 95% confidence 
intervals. 
Figure 4: Average effort by contract type over time in repeated contract choice settings 
(TBR-r) 
 
Notes: TC, BC and RSC indicate the trust, the bonus and the revenue sharing contract, respectively. The lines 
labelled TBR first only contain observations from subjects that first were confronted with the games TBR and TBR-
r before playing games with exogenously imposed contracts (TC-ex, BC-ex and RSC-ex). Conversely, exogenous 
first indicates that subjects first faced exogenously imposed contracts before giving the principals the choice over 
contract types (see Figure 1 for a description of both orders). Note that in the condition TC-exogenous first not a 
single principal chose TC in round 5 or 6 (hence these observations are missing from the figure). 
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Figure 5: Conditioning of actual bonus payments on revealed effort 
 
Notes: The figure shows mean actual bonus payments depending on whether the revealed effort was higher than, 
the same as or lower than the suggested effort. Agents were punished with significantly lower bonus payments 
when they exerted less effort than suggested (Wilcoxon p<0.001). Error bars denote standard errors. 
Figure 6: Histograms of revenue shares offered by principals 
 
Notes: This figure includes observations of all revenue sharing contracts, irrespective the actual setting (RSC-ex, 
TBR and TBR-r). The vertical lines depict the lowest incentive compatible share under self-interest (long dash, at 
0.27) and the share that results in an exact 50:50 split (dash dotted, at 0.57). 
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Table 1: Theoretical Predictions 
Both Principal and Agent are self-interested 
 Fixed Wage Bonus Share ΠP ΠA UP UA 
Revenue Sharing Contract 0 - 0.27 5190 ECU 3390 ECU 5190 3390 
Bonus Contract 0 0 - 3000 ECU 3000 ECU 3000 3000 
Trust Contract 0 - - 3000 ECU 3000 ECU 3000 3000 
Principal is self-interested and Agent is inequity averse 
 Fixed Wage Bonus Share ΠP ΠA UP UA 
Revenue sharing Contract 0 - 0.52 4440 ECU 4140 ECU 4440 3840 
Bonus Contract 1701 ECU 0 - 4299 ECU 4281 ECU 4299* 4263 
Trust Contract 1701 ECU - - 4299 ECU 4281 ECU 4299* 4263 
Notes: This table summarizes the theoretical predictions for each of the three contracts under the assumption of 
narrow self-interest and inequity averse preferences, using a utility function as in Fehr and Schmidt (1999). For 
RSC under narrow self-interest this results in a 60:40 split in favor of the principal, i.e. 
[5190/(5190+3390)]/[3390/(5190+3390)]. *If, in addition to the agent, also the principal had inequity averse 
preferences, these utility values would change to 4293 (for both the BC and the TC), yet the optimal contracts 
remain unchanged. 
Table 2: Percentages of chosen contracts 
  TBR TBR-r 
TC 4.17% 4.40% 
BC 20.83% 20.83% 
RSC  75.00% 74.77% 
Notes: All differences between contract types are highly significant in Wilcoxon tests (all p<0.01 for both TBR 
and TBR-r). Specifically, TC vs RSC: p<0.001 for TBR and TBR-r, BC vs RSC: p<0.001 for TBR and TBR-r; TC 
vs BC: p=0.007 for TBR and p<0.001 for TBR-r. 
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Table 3: Proportion of switches between contracts that resulted in improved outcomes 
    Higher individual profits Higher total revenue of  
    Principal Agent principal-agent pair 
TC     → 
BC 50.0% 50.0% 75.0% 
RSC 77.8% 55.6% 88.9% 
BC     → 
TC 60.0% 20.0% 20.0% 
RSC 72.7% 69.7% 63.6% 
RSC  → 
TC 25.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
BC 34.6% 50.0% 26.9% 
Notes: This table is based on data from rounds 2-6 of TBR-r games. Only contract switches were considered, i.e. 
if principals chose a different contract in round t-1 then in round t. The differences in the principals’ profits are 
highly significant for both switching from TC to RSC and from BC to RSC (Wilcoxon tests: p=0.013 and p=0.005, 
respectively). Although switching to the RSC from either TC or BC also made at least 55.6% of agents better off, 
the average increase in agents’ profits is not significant (p=0.450 and p=0.672 for TC->RSC and BC->RSC, 
respectively). 
Table 4: Determinants of Agents’ Effort for Accepted Contracts 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
  all all RSC only BC only 
BC 3.951*** 8.711***     
  (0.889) (1.761)     
RSC 9.015*** 13.38***     
  (1.034) (1.417)     
Suggested effort 0.489*** 0.0454 0.397 0.245 
  (0.0884) (0.0931) (0.218) (0.143) 
Fixed wage -0.0000241 0.00481*** -0.000246 0.00347* 
  (0.000838) (0.00129) (0.00118) (0.00145) 
Exogenous contract -1.449 0.895 -1.223 -2.801 
  (1.007) (2.043) (1.099) (1.795) 
Game TBR -0.812 -1.889 -1.007 -3.367 
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  (0.865) (2.093) (0.818) (2.899) 
Overall round -0.0388 -0.0469 -0.0872 -0.107 
  (0.115) (0.113) (0.117) (0.226) 
Round within game TBR-r -0.0455 -0.0441 -0.0767 -0.245 
  (0.156) (0.154) (0.159) (0.408) 
BC x fixed wage   -0.00328     
    (0.00213)     
BC x suggested effort   0.468**     
    (0.154)     
RSC x fixed wage   -0.00743***     
    (0.00161)     
RSC x suggested effort   0.762***     
    (0.221)     
Exogenous contract x BC   -3.466     
    (2.221)     
Exogenous contract x RSC   -1.884     
    (2.097)     
Game TBR x BC   -0.736     
    (3.175)     
Game TBR x RSC   1.413     
    (1.961)     
Share     7.931***   
      (2.281)   
Incentive compatible share     3.000*   
      (1.150)   
Announced bonus       0.00503*** 
        (0.000960) 
Constant 8.205*** 3.270* 15.71*** 8.421*** 
  (0.896) (1.555) (0.768) (1.481) 
Observations 656 656 418 155 
Adjusted R2 0.376 0.402 0.237 0.176 
Notes: The baseline condition for the estimations in columns 1 and 2 was TC in the game TBR-r. Columns 3 and 
4 were estimated using only RSC and BC observations, respectively. The table contains coefficients of linear 
regressions with standard errors clustered at subject level in parentheses. All variables that were interacted with 
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BC or RSC (i.e. fixed wage, announced bonus, suggested effort, share, incentive compatible share, exogenous 
contract and exogenous games first) were subtracted off their means before estimating the models. Tables C5 and 
C6 in the online appendix contain the results of multilevel models (to additionally control for session level non-
independence) and Tobit regressions (to control for data censoring at 0 and 20), respectively. These results are very 
close to those presented here (both qualitatively and quantitatively). BC and RSC are dummies for the bonus and 
the revenue sharing contract, respectively. TBR and TBR-r indicate one-shot and repeated games with endogenous 
contract choice by the principal. The dummy incentive compatible share is one if the principal offered a share ≥ 
0.27, the lowest share that satisfied the incentive compatibility constraint, and zero otherwise. Exogenous contract 
is a dummy for TC-ex, BC-ex and RSC-ex games and the dummy exogenous games first controls for order effects; 
***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at 0.1%, 1% and 5% level.  
Table 5: Predicted and observed distribution of profits resulting from revenue sharing 
contracts 
Prediction  Observation 
    Profit Share    Profit Share 
Self 
Interest 
Principal 5190 60%  
Results 
RSC-ex 
Principal 4206 53% 
Agent 3390 40%  Agent 3741 47% 
Difference  20%  Difference  6% 
Inequity 
averse 
agent 
Principal 4440 52%  
Results 
TBR 
Principal 4269 53% 
Agent 4140 48%  Agent 3806 47% 
Difference  4%  Difference  6% 
     
Results 
TBR-r 
Principal 4359 54% 
     Agent 3786 46% 
     Difference  7% 
Notes: RSC-ex denotes an exogenously determined one-shot revenue sharing contract. TBR and TBR-r represent 
contract choice situations in a one-shot and repeated game, respectively. Only accepted contracts are considered 
for the profits in the right part of the table (Observation). 
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Table 6: Average and standard deviation of profits across contracts 
    
Trust Contract Bonus Contract Revenue Sharing 
Contract 
    Av. Profit SD Av. Profit SD Av. Profit SD 
Exogenously 
determined 
Principal 3058 (46%) 720 3657 (51%) 981 4206 (53%) 757 
Agent 3618 (54%) 500 3505 (49%) 533 3741 (47%) 467 
Total 6675 (100%) 887 7162 (100%) 1086 7947 (100%) 862 
TBR  
Principal 2700 (44%) 173 3582 (48%) 1205 4269 (53%) 577 
Agent 3496 (56%) 3 3663 (52%) 542 3806 (47%) 410 
Total 6196 (100%) 170 7245 (100%) 1190 8075 (100%) 730 
TBR-r 
Principal 2875 (42%) 1076 3733 (49%) 988 4359 (54%) 651 
Agent 3849 (58%) 668 3755 (51%) 660 3786 (46%) 428 
Total 6725 (100%) 995 7489 (100%) 1136 8145 (100%) 768 
Notes: TBR and TBR-r represent contract choice situations in a one-shot and repeated game, respectively. The 
overall profits were significantly higher in revenue sharing contracts than in trust contracts (Wilcoxon p<0.001, 
p=0.011, p<0.001 in relation to exogenous contracts, TBR and TBR-r, respectively) and bonus contracts (Wilcoxon 
p<0.001, p=0.05, p<0.001 in relation to exogenous contracts, TBR and TBR-r, respectively). Principals earn 
significantly more with revenue sharing contracts (with respect to trust contracts: Wilcoxon p<0.001, p=0.011, 
p<0.001 in relation to exogenous contracts, TBR and TBR-r respectively. With respect to bonus contracts: 
Wilcoxon p=0.004, p=0.028, p<0.001 in relation to exogenous contracts, TBR and TBR-r respectively). The 
agents’ profits are larger in RSC than in other contracts when it is exogenously imposed (BC<->RSC: p=0.005 and 
TC<->RSC: p=0.078), but this is not the case for TBR (BC<->RSC: p=0.508 TC<->RSC: p=0.036) and TBR-r 
(BC<->RSC: p=0.551, TC<->RSC: p=0.432). In RSC agents are almost no worse off with respect to trust contracts: 
Wilcoxon p=0.078, p=0.036, p=0.432 in relation to exogenous contracts, TBR and TBR-r respectively; with respect 
to bonus contracts: Wilcoxon p=0.005, p=0.508, p=0.551 in relation to exogenous contracts, TBR and TBR-r 
respectively). 
